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The heated debate over issues of separation of church and state
presents few more controversial questions than the one addressed
in the recently passed Equal Access Act'-that of the proper role of
religion in the public schools. The Act addresses a narrow slice of
this broad issue, the question whether student religious groups
should be allowed to meet on public school premises. Into a delib-
eration already complicated by competing local interests and state
and federal legal requirements, the Act injects yet another ele-
ment-a federal directive to local school districts to allow such
groups to meet.
In succumbing to political pressures to pass the Equal Access Act,
Congress has failed adequately to consider important principles of
federalism. It has used an attenuated connection to federal funding
to induce states to accept the congressional vision of the appropri-
ate student meetings policy for local school districts. The result is
an act which is seriously flawed, and potentially unenforceable. Sig-
nificant enforcement problems stem from the fact that the Act fore-
closes the most appropriate remedy for its violation, that of a denial
of funds, while providing no alternative enforcement mechanisms.
Even more seriously, the Act creates an unanticipated conflict with
many state constitutional provisions requiring a stricter separation
of church and state than is imposed by the federal establishment
clause. This conflict will leave many school authorities with the lim-
ited choices of forgoing federal funds or barring all student meet-
ings, a result that, ironically, would diminish rather than enhance
the quality of state public education.
This is not merely a case of poor drafting. Congress is not well-
1. Pub. L. No. 98-377, Title VIII, 98 Stat. 1302 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Equal
Access Act and by section number].
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suited to address such inherently local concerns as the regulation of
public schools. Federal legislation in this sensitive area, which is
necessarily based on a tenuous connection to federal funding, can-
not produce the uniform national practice sought. A close examina-
tion of the Act and its failings reveals why the question of student
religious meetings in public high schools is best left to the care of
the states and the judiciary. Such an examination also reveals two
ways in which courts can treat the Act in order to ameliorate its
harsh and unforeseen consequences: utilizing the Act's "safety
valves" to accommodate state constitutional provisions or treating
the Act as merely a statement of national policy.
I. The Equal Access Act
A. The Political Background
The Equal Access Act represents a marked departure from the
general congressional policy of non-interference with local school
administration.2 Congress' role in this area, even in its most active
posture, has been limited largely to providing financial assistance to
states and localities in those areas in which Congress has identified
particularly acute problems,3 such as the education of handicapped
children and provision of vocational education. 4 With the advent of
the Reagan Administration's "New Federalism" even this limited
role has been cut back. Drastic educational funding cuts have been
proposed, and local discretion in administering existing funding
programs has been emphasized. 5 In sharp contrast, the Equal Ac-
cess Act attempts to dictate to school authorities basic policy choices
2. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232a (1982) (Federal Non-Interference With Curriculum
Statute); 20 U.S.C. § 3403(b) (1982) (establishing the Department of Education subject
to Federal Non-Interference With Curriculum Statute).
3. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. H3877 (daily ed. May 15, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Porter)
("The genius of our system of public education has been local control .... Washing-
ton's only role has been . . . support for special categorical needs."); Griffith, The U.S.
Department of Education and the Issue of Control of Education, 12 URB. LAw. 500, 501 (1980)
(discussing limited federal role in education).
4. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
(1982); Vocational Education Amendments of 1968, 20 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.; see also Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 241a etseq. (providing funds
for teaching educationally deprived children); Education Amendments of 1978, 20
U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (providing funds for textbooks and school supplies); Educational
Agencies Affected by Federal Activities Act of 1950, 20 U.S.C. § 236 et seq. (providing
federal assistance for school districts affected by federal activities and for the provision
of education to native American children).
5. See Birman & Ginsburg, The Federal Role in Elementary and Secondary Education: New
Directions and Continuing Concerns, 14 URB. LAw. 471 (1982) (analyzing education propos-




about a fundamentally local issue-access by student groups to
school premises.
This surprising departure from both the pattern of most federal
educational statutes and the general approach of Reagan Adminis-
tration policies toward education is best explained by reference to
the political controversy that prompted the Act's passage. Its enact-
ment closely followed the defeat of a bill proposing a constitutional
amendment that would have reinstated prayer in the public
schools, 6 thereby reversing the Supreme Court's decision in Engel v.
Vitale.7 The connection between school prayer and the equal access
questions addressed in the Act was denied by some of the bill's pro-
ponents. 8 However, others labeled the Act a "backdoor" attempt to
get prayer back in the schools; 9 in their view, equal access repre-
sents only the first step toward a broad expansion of the religious
activity permissible in public schools. There can be no doubt that
many of the bill's supporters saw a close link between the two
measures. 10
That the Act reflects political pressures," rather than a well
6. SJ. Res. 73, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) which would have provided for a consti-
tutional amendment incorporating a right to prayer in public schools, was defeated on
March 20, 1984, 11 votes short of the requisite two-thirds majority. See The School Prayer
Controversy, 63 CONG. DIGEST 135, 137 (1984). Recently, Congress has also considered a
series of bills to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over school prayer cases and a
proposed bill to permit silent prayer in the schools. See id. at 135-37.
7. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state laws requiring the recitation of a state-composed
prayer in public classrooms violates establishment clause); see also School Dist. of Abing-
ton Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating mandatory Bible reading
and recitation of the Lord's Prayer); Karen B. v. Treen, 455 U.S. 913 (1982), aff'g 653
F.2d 897, 900-02 (5th Cir. 1981) (state-required school prayer at start of school day led
by teacher or appointed student violates establishment clause). The Court had also pre-
viously held that school-sponsored religious classes taught on school premises during
schooltime by private church groups violated the establishment clause. McCollom v.
Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). See generally S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 28
(1984).
8. See 130 CONG. REC. S8337 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield) (the
bill has "nothing to do with school prayer"); id. at S8357 (remarks of Sen. Durenberger)
(equal access is "clearly distinguishable from the issue we recently debated as voluntary
prayer in the classroom").
9. Id. at S8352 (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum); see also id. at H7733 (daily ed. July 25,
1984) (remarks of Rep. Ackerman) (referring to the equal access bill as "the son of
school prayer").
10. See, e.g., id. at S8366 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Grassley); id. at
H7725 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Schumer) (quoting the Rev. Jerry
Falwell's comment that "[w]e knew we couldn't win on school prayer but equal access
gets us what we wanted all along"). In general, there is little question that equal access
is related to school prayer, since student-initiated prayer is among the activities which
are permissible at the meetings sanctioned under the Act.
11. The hearings on equal access explicitly refer to the tension between public opin-
ion and federal judicial decisions barring student religious meetings in public schools.
See, e.g., Equal Access: A First Amendment Question: Hearings on S. 815 and S. 1059 Before the
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thought-out legislative initiative, is also revealed by its hasty passage
a scant three months before election day.' 2 The final version of the
Act was introduced late in the Senate floor debates as an amend-
ment to the original bill.' 3 It was hurried through Congress without
public hearings or a committee report,' 4 and with strikingly few
hours of floor debate.' 5 It is hardly surprising, under these circum-
stances, that the Act's provisions remain ambiguous, even to its
sponsors,' 6 and that it promises unintended consequences.
B. The Act as an Extension of Supreme Court Doctrine
The Act is an explicit attempt to extend to public secondary
schools the Supreme Court's holding in Widmar v. Vincent. 17 In
Widmar, the Court held that when state colleges and universities of-
fer a "public forum" generally open to student groups, they may not
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 238 (1983) (testimony of Ted
Pantaleo, The Freedom Council) ("The vast majority would welcome the return of vol-
untary, student-initiated prayer in our State and public schools again.").
12. The bill was passed by the Senate on June 27, 1984, see 130 CONG. REC. S8370
(daily ed. June 27, 1984), and by the House on July 25, 1984, see id. at H7740-41 (daily
ed. July 25, 1984), and was signed into law by the President on August 11, 1984.
13. See id. at S8338 (daily ed. June 27, 1984). The version of the Act originally intro-
duced on the Senate floor, S. 1059, had been considered in both hearings, see supra note
11, and a committee report, see S. REP. No. 357, supra note 7. However, S. 1059 was
significantly different from Senator Hatfield's version, which eventually passed. Other
earlier versions had also received more extensive consideration. See H.R. REP. No. 710,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (report on H.R. 5345); Hearings on the Equal Access Act: Hear-
ings on H.R. 2732 Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Religious Speech Protection
Act: Hearing on H. R. 4996 Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Educa-
tion of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
14. See 130 CONG. REC. H7727-28 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (remarks of Rep.
Edwards) ("The Senate had no hearings, none whatsoever on the equal access amend-
ment . . . . [N]o committee has had any opportunity to have hearings or any kind of
study on this bill written on the floor of [the Senate], and yet there are important consti-
tutional questions involved."); id. at H7736 (remarks of Rep. Fish) ("Have the various
House committees with jurisdiction over this bill held hearings on this language? No.").
15. The Senate's consideration of the final version of the Act was limited to forty-
odd pages in the Congressional Record, while it was considered in the House under a
suspension of the rules, whereby debate was limited to an hour and no amendments
were allowed. There was significant objection to this procedure. See, e.g., id. at H7728
(daily ed. July 25, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Edward) ("We need until [August 6th] to
study the Senate bill, to hold public hearings, to learn more about the grave constitu-
tional implications of this bill . . . . [T]his is not a responsible course of action by this
body..."); id. at H7733 (remarks of Rep. Oakar) ("I take great offense at the consider-
ation of this legislation under suspension thereby denying the Members of this body the
opportunity of amending the language of the bill."); id. at H7736 (remarks of Rep.
Schumer) ("Are we abdicating our responsibilities as legislators by rushing through such
an important piece of legislation without thought to its consequences? Yes.").
16. See id. at S8354-55 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (exchange between Sen. Chiles and
Sen. Hatfield); see also id. at H7736 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Fish).




discriminate against certain groups based on the religious content
of their speech.18 Treating the issue as one of free speech, the Court
applied traditional first amendment analysis, requiring that such
content-based exclusion of religious speech be justified by a "com-
pelling state interest." The state's interest in complying with the
establishment clause provisions of federal and state constitutions,
the Court held, was not such a "compelling interest" for two rea-
sons: First, the Court held that allowing such meetings on a state
university campus would not violate the federal establishment
clause; second, the Court held that the state's interest in maintain-
ing a stricter separation of church and state than federally required,
based on the state constitution, could not constitute such a "com-
pelling state interest" in the context presented.1 9
However, the Court was careful to confine its "narrow" 20 holding
to the level of public higher education, stating that "[u]niversity stu-
dents are, of course, young adults . . . less impressionable than
younger students." 2' This distinction is an important one, since
constitutional analysis in this area often turns on whether the chal-
lenged activity gives the appearance of government approval of reli-
gion. Thus, Widmar left open the question of whether allowing
student religious groups to meet in public high schools would vio-
late the federal establishment clause.22 At the time the Act was
passed, the Court had refused to hear several cases that presented
this specific issue, despite disagreements among the lower federal
courts. 23 The Equal Access Act thus reflects an explicit attempt by
Congress to resolve this conflict in favor of allowing religious stu-
18. Id. at 277.
19. Id. at 274-77.
20. Id. at 276.
21. Id. at 277.
22. Id. at 274 n.14. The Court also declined to reach the question of whether stu-
dents have a right to hold religious meetings in the free exercise of their religion. Id. at
273 n. 14.
23. See Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Brandon v. Bd. of Educ. of the
Guilderland Cent. School Dist., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123
(1981). In the Brandon case, decided before Widmar, the Court had held that school
districts must prohibit extracurricular student-initiated religious discussions. A number
of courts, including the Lubbock court, had followed Brandon in cases involving public
secondary schools, some even after Widmar was decided. See Nartowicz v. Clayton
County School Dist., 83 Civ. IA, Slip Op. (M.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd, 736 F.2d 646 (11 th Cir.
1984); Hunt v. Bd. of Educ. of County of Kanawha, 321 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. W. Va.
1971);Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137
Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977); Trietly v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of
Buffalo, 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912 (4th Dept. 1978). Other courts, however, had
held such meetings to be permissible. See, e.g., Country Hills Christian Church v. Uni-
fied School Dist., No. 82-2345, Slip Op. (D. Kan. March 29, 1983).
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dent meetings in secondary schools, 24  perhaps nudging the
Supreme Court toward a faster, if not also a similar, decision on the
issue. In fact, the Court has since granted certiorari in a case apply-
ing Widmar to a public high school.2 5
C. The Act's Provisions
It is important to note that for authority to legislate the Act Con-
gress did not rely upon the first amendment, but rather upon the
congressional spending power. 26 In its preamble, the Act declares
that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which
receives Federal financial assistance" to engage in the proscribed
practices. 27 Thus, the Act applies to public schools only indirectly
through the lever provided by the receipt of federal funds. 28 At the
same time, however, it specifies that funds are not to be denied as a
sanction for violation of the Act's terms.29
In other respects, the Act is very closely modeled on the Widmar
decision's language. It is triggered only where a federally assisted
public secondary school offers a "limited open forum."30 The term
"limited open forum," however, is broadly defined as allowing "one
or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school
premises during noninstructional time." 3' While the term "noncur-
24. The legislative history contains repeated references to the congressional inten-
tion to clear up the "confusion" created for school administrators by the disagreements
among the lower federal courts. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 710, supra note 13, at 3; S. REP.
No. 357, supra note 7, at 6.
25. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983),
rev'd, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3586-87 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985)
(No. 84-773).
26. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 1 ("Congress shall have the Power To lay and
collect Taxes . . .to . ..provide for the . . .General Welfare of the United States.").
27. Equal Access Act § 802(a).
28. This is a substantial lever. It is estimated that "[o]nly a handful of the approxi-
mately 16,000 public school districts in the United States do not receive federal financial
assistance of some kind," Stern, Public Education, 10 URB. LAw. 497, 497 (1978), and it
was clearly suggested in the legislative history that Congress assumed that tying the bill
to federal funds would allow it to reach most public secondary schools. See 130 CONG.
REc. H3857 (daily ed. May 15, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Edwards) (noting that the similar
predecessor bill would have injected "the imperial power of the Federal Government
...into every one of the 15,517 school districts in the United States").
29. The Act provides that "nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize the
United States to deny or withhold Federal financial assistance to any school." Equal
Access Act § 802(e), see also infra text accompanying notes 77-78 (discussing conse-
quences of refusal to allow withholding of federal funding).
30. Equal Access Act § 802(a). This term is modeled on the "limited public forum"
which triggers constitutional scrutiny under free speech doctrine. See Widmar, 454 U.S.
at 273.
31. Equal Access Act § 802(b). The Act's application to all cases where a school
allows a single group to meet seems significantly broader than the definition of an "open




riculum related" is not defined in the legislation, the legislative his-
tory suggests that Congress contemplated that it would encompass a
broad range of activities, including chess clubs, student debate soci-
eties, and political organizations. 32
Wherever such student activities are permitted-which surely in-
cludes most school districts in the country-the Act's main provi-
sion applies. This provision specifies that such a school may not
deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any
students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open fo-
rum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other con-
tent of the speech at such meetings. 33
Such a "fair opportunity" is deemed to have been offered by the
school where it "uniformly provides" 34 that such a meeting is "vol-
untary and student-initiated," 3 5 involves no sponsorship by the
school or participation by school employees, 36 and is not controlled
or regularly attended by "nonschool persons." 37
The Act also contains certain "safety valves" that limit possible
forum in that case was available to a "broad class ... [of] over 100 recognized student
groups"). The term "noninstructional time" is defined under the Act to mean "time set
aside by the school before. . . instruction begins or after. . . instruction ends." Equal
Access Act § 803(4).
32. The closest the Act comes to defining "noncurriculum related student groups" is
in its definition of "meeting," which includes activities which conform to the school's
access policies and are "not directly related to the school curriculum." Equal Access Act
§ 803(3). The Act's sponsor, Senator Hatfield, anticipated that noncurriculum related
groups would include "the chess club, the Young Democrats, [and] the Young Republi-
cans." 130 CONG. REC. S8342 (daily ed. June 27, 1984); see also id. at S8362 (remarks of
Sen. Dole) (the term "noncurriculum related" removes certain ambiguities about
whether field trips trigger the Act's coverage). An alternative definition of "noncur-
riculum related" offered in the House would have encompassed "those student activities
which are either of a type which schools usually do not sponsor or those activities which
the school might sponsor but has not." Id. at H7732 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (remarks
of Rep. Goodling).
33. Equal Access Act § 802(a). The proscription of discrimination based on political
and philosophical, as well as religious, content was a response to opponents of the Act
who objected to the singling out of student religious speech for special protection. See,
e.g., 130 CONG. REC. H3857 (daily ed. May 15, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
34. Equal Access Act § 802(c).
35. Id. at § 802(c)(1). This requirement that the meetings be "voluntary and stu-
dent-initiated" was advisable to help the Act withstand constitutional scrutiny: Were
such meetings school-initiated, the resulting state support of religion would violate the
establishment clause; were the meetings nonvoluntary, students' free exercise rights
would be implicated.
36. Id. at §§ 802(c)(2),(3). The requirements that neither the school nor its employ-
ees sponsor the meetings, defined as "promoting, leading, or participating in a meet-
ing," id. at § 803(2), and that employees be present only in a "nonparticipatory"
capacity, id. at § 802(3), may have been designed to insulate the legislation from estab-
lishment clause challenge. See Note, The Constitutional Dimensions of Student-Initiated Activi-
ties In Public High Schools, 92 YALE L.J. 499, 514 (1983) (for school board to avoid
advancing religion, student religious meetings must be entirely student-initiated).
37. Equal Access Act § 802(c)(5). A final provision requires that such meetings addi-
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constructions of the statute. These provisions preserve the state's
leeway to ban student meetings which, although religious in nature,
would conflict with fundamental public policies. Of these provi-
sions, two are particularly significant: The first provides that noth-
ing in the Act is to be construed to authorize any government to
"sanction meetings that are otherwise unlawful;" 38 the other bars
interpreting the Act to allow governments to "abridge the constitu-
tional rights of any person.'"'3
II. Enforcement Problems
Aside from the inherent ambiguity of the Act's provisions, the
prospect of its enforcement presents several fundamental problems.
The combination of reliance on the spending power for authority,
explicit denial of any fund cut-off as a remedy, and omission of any
other express remedy results in a statute that appears to confer sub-
stantive rights without providing for a remedy in the event of their
violation. These enforcement problems can be viewed from two
perspectives: that of parties seeking to enforce the Act in court and
that of school officials seeking to implement it.
A. Problems in Seeking Judicial Enforcement
On its face, the Act has no enforcement mechanism. The remedy
of a cut-off of federal funding, a key provision in earlier versions, 40
is specifically forbidden. 41 Similarly, provisions present in earlier
tionally not "materially and substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of educa-
tional activities within the school." Id. at § 802(c)(4).
38. Id. at § 802(d)(5).
39. Id. at § 802(d)(7). The Act is also not to be read to authorize any government
"to influence the form or content of any prayer," id. at § 802(d)(1), "to require any
person to participate in . . .religious activity," id. at § 802(d)(2), to expend public funds
beyond the cost of providing space, id. at § 802(d)(3), to compel any teacher to attend a
student meeting if the content of the meeting is against his or her beliefs, id. at
§ 802(d)(4), or "to limit the rights of groups of students which are not of a specified
numerical size," id. at § 802(d)(6). Again, most of these are designed to protect the Act
from an establishment clause challenge, while the last two address the possible free ex-
ercise issues raised for teachers and members of minority religions.
40. For example, H.R. 4996 was subtitled an Act "[t]o provide that no federal educa-
tional funds may be obligated or expended to any state or local educational agency
which discriminates against [voluntary student religious meetings]," and a provision for
the cut-off of funds was its central enforcement mechanism. H.R. 4996, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984); see also H.R. 5345, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (same).
41. Equal Access Act § 802(e) (quoted in full supra note 29). The addition of this
proviso that federal funds may not be withheld or denied for violations of the Act was
crucial to its passage. Much of the opposition to earlier bills cited the "Draconian sanc-
tion" of a fund cut-off as a primary objection, 130 CONG. REC. H3857 (daily ed. May 15,
1984) (remarks of Rep. Edwards), finding it unfair that "[i]f one school in a school dis-




bills for enforcement by the Attorney General 42 and by private citi-
zens 43 were deleted from the final version, as was an extensive sec-
tion providing for federal jurisdiction over Equal Access Act cases. 44
As it now stands, the only mention of enforcement mechanisms is a
few brief passages in the Act's legislative history.45 Therefore, any
party seeking to enforce the Act in court will, as a threshold matter,
carry the heavy burden of establishing a right even to seek
enforcement.
1. Judicial Enforcement By Private Parties
For private parties, this means establishing either that a private
cause of action should be implied from the Act,46 or that a civil
be cut off," id. at H3876 (remarks of Rep. Kostmayer). Many who had voted against the
original bill cited the cut-off proviso as one reason for changing their vote. See, e.g., id. at
H7737 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Smith); id. at H7738 (remarks of Rep.
Slattery).
42. See S. 1059, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a) (1984) (authorizing the Attorney General
to receive and investigate complaints and to institute suits, based on those complaints,
to enforce the Act).
43. See id. at § 3 (authorizing individual actions to enforce the Act); S. 815, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (same).
44. See S. 1059, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1984) (granting federal district court juris-
diction regardless of amount in controversy); S. 815, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)
(same).
45. There is apparently only one off-hand reference to the problem of enforcement
of the Act, in which Senator Hatfield noted that rather than providing for the cut-off of
funds, the bill provides "due process and an implied judicial remedy." 130 CONG. REC.
S8355 (daily ed. June 27, 1984). However, this was the only mention of contemplated
enforcement mechanisms, and there was no discussion at all of government suits.
46. In order to establish a right to sue to enforce a statute where no cause of action
is expressly provided, a private party must establish that Congress intended to create an
implied cause of action. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979)
("The central inquiry [is] whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by
implication, a private cause of action."). The "preferred approach" for determining
whether such an intent exists is the test articulated in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),
which measures four indications of intent. The four relevant factors, in summary, are:
(1) whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted," that is, whether the "statute create[s] a federal right in favor of the plaintiff;"
(2) whether there is "any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one;" (3) whether it is "consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff;" and
(4) whether the area is "one traditionally relegated to state law ... so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law." Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. at 78 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). If the first two factors indicate that
Congress did not intend a private cause of action, however, it is dispositive, and there is
no need to consider all four. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981). In
fact, in the case of funding statutes, it is often the first question that determines the
outcome, since it is usually most difficult to decide whether or not a funding statute was
intended to create an enforceable federal right. The central inquiry is whether the stat-
ute is written with an "unmistakable focus on the benefited class," or is written "simply
as a ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition
against the disbursement of public funds to. . .institutions engaged in [such] discrimi-
natory practices." Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 691-93 (1979). This de-
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rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be available.47 If, how-
ever, the Act is viewed as funding legislation, recent Supreme Court
doctrine suggests that these causes of action may be unavailable,
since both causes depend on whether the Act was intended to create
enforceable "rights" in private parties, a problematic inquiry where
funding statutes are involved. 48 Moreover, even if a private party is
pends primarily on the language of the statute. Id. at 690-93 & n.13 ("[T]he right-or
duty-creating language of the statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of
the propriety of implication of a cause of action."); see also Univs. Research Ass'n v.
Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771-72 (1981) (quoting Cannon test). In this case, it would be very
difficult to decide whether the Act's wording supports an implied private cause of action.
It is literally worded as a "ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal
funds"-here public secondary schools-which suggests that a cause of action should
not be implied. However, it is at the same time not dissimilar to statutes which have
been found to support such a cause of action. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677 (finding an
implied cause of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). The
question, in essence, is whether a statute which does not specify that "no person" be
denied rights may nonetheless create enforceable federal rights. See id. at 690 n. 13 (cit-
ing examples of statutes). The Supreme Court has recently stressed that the question is
"not simply who would benefit from the Act, but whether Congress intended to confer
federal rights upon those beneficiaries," California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 294, and
that "the fact that a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not
automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person," Cannon, 441
U.S. at 688, which suggests a restrictive approach to implying federal rights. See also
United States v. Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1980) ("In recent years the
Court has been far more reluctant to infer rights of action for silent statutes."). On the
other hand, this Act seems to convey few benefits on any party other than any federal
right which might be created, since it authorizes no additional funds to be expended.
Looking to the second factor of the Cort test, the answer is similarly not clear-cut. On
balance, however, it weighs slightly against implying such a remedy, since the defeat of
amendments which would have provided for a private cause of action is considered a
significant indication of an intent to deny such a remedy. See Coutu, 450 U.S. at 778. In
sum, whether an implied private right of action should be available to enforce the Act is
at least a close question.
47. While the Supreme Court in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), affirmed
that actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are available to enforce federal statutes as well as
federal constitutional rights, it added several important qualifications to this rule shortly
thereafter. In particular, a § 1983 action is not available if either the federal statute in
question creates no enforceable rights, or Congress has created exclusive remedies for
the enforcement of the statute which preclude any other form of action. See Middlesex
County Sewage Auth. v. Nat. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1981). Given the first
limitation, which focuses on the question of whether Congress intended to create en-
forceable rights, the inquiry is clearly closely linked to the question of whether a private
cause of an action should be available. However, whereas a court determining the latter
question must presume that congressional silence means no cause of action was in-
tended, the § 1983 inquiry assumes that a cause of action is available unless Congress
intended to foreclose such a remedy. See, e.g., Rousseau v. City of Philadelphia, 589 F.
Supp. 961, 972 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Ryans v. New Jersey Comm'n for the Blind, 542 F.
Supp. 841, 846 (D.N.J. 1982). The key question is whether allowing a § 1983 action is
consistent with congressional intent. See Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532
F. Supp. 460, 476 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (finding § 1983 action precluded because the expan-
sive relief such an action would allow would be inconsistent with statutory scheme).
Again, the answer is not clear-cut in this case.
48. In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), which es-
sentially defined the current contours of federal funding law, the Court held that the




permitted to sue, the scope of relief available under a funding stat-
ute has been curtailed sharply by recent Supreme Court decisions,
which may effectively nullify the benefit of establishing a cause of
action in the first place.49
2. Public Enforcement
Similarly, if the federal government seeks to enforce the Act, it
must prove that the statute contemplates public enforcement. 50
of Rights Act did not create any substantive rights for residents in state hospitals in
states receiving funds under the Act. Answering the question whether a private cause of
action existed under the funding statute involved in Pennhurst, the Court noted that in
"legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical remedy for state non-
compliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action ...but
rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State." Id. at 28.
The Court also addressed the question of whether a § 1983 action would be available to
enforce the funding statute, noting that this would depend in part on whether an indi-
vidual's interest in having a state submit assurances of compliance with funding condi-
tions is a "right secured" by the laws of the United States, an issue which it considered
"at least an open question." Id.; see also Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. Nat. Sea
Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20-21 (§ 1983 actions are generally available unless the federal
statute forecloses such relief or makes clear that no federal "right" is created).
49. In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n of the City of New York, 103 S. Ct.
3221 (1983) the Supreme Court held that while a private action was available to enforce
the anti-discrimination provision of Title VI, the private party was not entitled to a
"make whole" remedy where the alleged violation was for unintentional, rather than
intentional, discrimination. Id. at 3228. It noted that " 'make whole' remedies are not
ordinarily appropriate in private actions seeking relief for violations of statutes passed
by Congress pursuant to its 'power under the Spending Clause to place conditions on
the grant of federal funds.' " Id. at 3229 (quoting Pennhurst). In such cases, only "lim-
ited injunctive relief' is available, and "relief based on past violations of the conditions
attached to the use of federal funds . . . is not available." Id. at 3232. Rather, the court
must simply "identify the violation and enjoin its continuance or order recipients of
federal funds prospectively to perform their duties incident to the receipt of federal
money," giving the recipient the "option of withdrawing and hence terminating the pro-
spective force of the injunction." Id. at 3229. This holding relied on the fact that in that
case, as in the present one, the condition of funding-there liability for unintentional
discrimination-was not present at the time funds were initially accepted. Thus the
same rationale should apply here. Moreover, in this case, where Congress specifically
intended that funds not be cut off or denied as a sanction for the Act's violation, it is also
arguable that it did not intend for schools to be forced, through self-denial, to forgo
funds at all. This would mean that not even the limited relief available in Guardians
Association would be available in this case.
50. For the government to establish a right to enforce a statute where no express
authorization is present, it must prove that it has an "interest" that will support such a
suit. Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201 (1967). While In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564 (1895), suggested that such a suit would be possible whenever alleged statutory
violations "affect the public at large," id. at 586, only one court has come even close to
such an expansive reading. See United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). Rather, courts have held that in order to support a suit by the govern-
ment, there must be "a property interest, interference with national security or a burden
on interstate commerce." United States v. Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295, 1298-99 (9th Cir.
1979); see also United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121, 1127 (4th Cir. 1977) (in all of
the cases allowing a government suit, "the United States had a property interest to be
protected or there was a well-defined statutory interest of the public at large to be pro-
tected"). Where a funding statute is involved, it has been held that while such legisla-
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Under the law governing federal enforcement of funding statutes,
however, the government's power to seek judicial relief is strictly
limited, and would be difficult to establish in this case. 5' Such a suit
is based on the existence of a "contract" between the state and fed-
eral governments, in which public enforcement is premised on the
government's rights as a party to that contract. However, it is not at
all clear that the Act unambiguously creates conditions, judicially
enforceable, on which such a government contract suit against the
school district could be based.
B. The Dilemma of State Officials Seeking to Implement the Act
Many state authorities seeking to implement the Act face a di-
lemma never even considered by Congress in passing the Act:
Often, state constitutions directly address the question of religious
activities in public schools. Many state constitutions provide de-
tion "does indicate a keen interest on the part of the federal government . . . that
interest [does] not extend[ ] beyond providing funds," and does not support a govern-
mental suit for equitable relief. Mattson, 600 F.2d at 1299. On the other hand, the
government's right under funding statutes to sue to enforce conditions of a grant is well
recognized, see, e.g., Solomon, 563 F.2d at 1129 (the United States has "implied authority
to sue for vindication of its proprietary and contractual interests in grants that it has
made"); United States v. Marion City School Dist., 625 F.2d 607, 609 (5th Cir. 1980)
(United States has "an inherent right to sue for enforcement of the [grant] recipient's
obligation in court"); United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079, 1084 (M.D. Ala. 1970)
(government has a "right to bring suit to require the recipient of federal grants to com-
ply with the terms and conditions of the grant"); as is its right to sue to recoup funds
spent in violation of the grant conditions, see Bell v. NewJersey and Pennsylvania, 103 S.
Ct. 2187 (1983) (government may recover funds misspent by the state under Title I of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act); Woods v. United States, 724 F.2d 1444,
1449 (9th Cir. 1984) (government has "implied power to recover funds spent in viola-
tion of the express terms and conditions of the grant"). These suits are premised on the
government's right, as a party to a contract, to invoke standard principles of contract
law. See id. (government has a right to make contracts and to "resort to the same reme-
dies as a private person" to protect that right); see also Frazer, 317 F. Supp. at 1084
("[T]he interest of the United States is to enforce the terms and conditions of grants of
federal funds.").
51. Such suits are usually based on an actual written assurance that the government
has received from the state, see, e.g., Marion City School Dist., 625 F.2d at 609 (case com-
pelling specific performance of assurances); United States v. County School Bd. of
Prince Georges County, 221 F. Supp. 93, 100 (E.D. Va. 1963) (the assurance forms a
term of the contract); and requires at the very least evidence that the conditions were
indeed voluntarily and unambiguously accepted, and a binding contract formed. See
United States v. Onslow County Bd. of Educ., 728 F.2d 628, 634 (4th Cir. 1984) (the
assurance shows that "Congress unambiguously imposed, and the [recipient] explicitly
accepted, the condition"). In this case, assurances are not required, and it is in fact
unlikely that they would even be permissible, since the congressional intent not to have
funds denied for failure to comply with the Act would logically seem to preclude such a
requirement. There is no reason why the provision that "nothing in this Title" be con-
strued to authorize a denial of funds should be limited to past violations of the Act,
rather than continuing refusal to comply. Thus it is unclear how-and whether-a state
could ever signal the knowing and voluntary acceptance required to form such a con-




tailed, and extensive, consideration of questions of religious
rights. 52 Even more importantly, the precise issue of allowing reli-
gious meetings on public school premises has often already been
considered under state constitutional provisions. The typical inter-
pretation is that religious meetings may be held on public school
property only if a fair rental fee is paid,53 and even then, many states
place restrictions on the times54 and places55 such meetings may be
52. State constitutions typically have a number of provisions dealing with issues of
religious rights, including free exercise clauses, establishment provisions, provisions re-
garding oaths of office, grants of exemption from state taxes for religious organizations,
bans on religious instruction in state schools, and provisions regarding the use of public
funds and lands for religious purposes. Wyoming, for example, has 11 separate provi-
sions governing questions of religion. See Wvo. CONST. art. 1, §§ 18, 19; art. 7,
§§ 4,5,6,7,8, 12; art. 10, § 12; art. 21, § 28; see also, e.g., IND. CONST. (six constitutional
provisions regarding religion); Ky. CoNsT. (five provisions); Mo. CONST. (same); ORE.
CONST. (six provisions); PA. CONST. (five provisions); S. C. CONST. (same); TEX. CONST.
(six provisions); UTAH CONSr. (seven provisions). Both on their face and as applied,
many state constitutions call for a stricter separation of church and state than is federally
required. See, e.g., American United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 720 (Mo.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976) (holding that the Missouri Constitution requires
stricter separation of church and state than that required by the federal Constitution),
cited in Widmar, 454 U.S. at 275 n.16; 1960-61 Op. GA. ATr'v GEN. 349 (finding that
Georgia Constitution's requirement of separation of church and state was intended to
have a stronger application than the first amendment to the federal Constitution); com-
pare Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (busing does not violate the federal
Constitution), with Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961) (holding that the
transportation of students to nonpublic schools would violate the Alaska Constitution),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 517 (1962); Bd. of Educ. For Indep. School Dist. No. 52 v. Antone,
384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963) (holding that transporting parochial school students at public
expense violates the Oklahoma Constitution); Mitchell v. Consol. School Dist. No. 201,
17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943) (holding that provision of transportation to stu-
dents attending private schools violates the Washington Constitution); compare also Bd.
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (finding free textbook loan programs permissible
under the federal Constitution), with California Teachers Ass'n v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794,
632 P.2d 953, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1981) (holding program for free textbook loans to
nonpublic schools to violate the California Constitution); People ex rel. Klinger v. Howl-
ett, 56 Ill. 2d 1, 305 N.E.2d 129 (1973) (same); Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480 (Ky.
1983) (same); Bloom v. School Committee of Springfield, 376 Mass. 35, 379 N.E.2d 578
(1978) (same); McDonald v. School Bd. of Yankton Indep. School Dist. No. 1, 246
N.W.2d 93 (S. Dak. 1976) (same).
53. In Wisconsin, for example, the state constitution was specifically amended to
allow the use of school buildings by religious organizations only "upon payment. . . of
reasonable compensation for such use." WIs. CONST. art. 1, § 24 (added 1972). In
other states, the same result has been reached by judicial decision or executive interpre-
tation. See Pratt v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 110 Ariz. 466, 469, 520 P.2d 514, 517 (1974)
(the lease of school facilities to religious groups without payment of fair market value
would violate the state constitution); 1966 Op. ALAS. ATr'y GEN. No. 3 (no establish-
ment of religion under state constitution so long as religious organizations using school
buildings are required to pay same rental fee as other groups); 59 Op. CAL. A-rr'y GEN.
214 (1976) (student religious groups may not hold devotional meetings on high school
premises during nonschool hours where no payment is contemplated in exchange for
the use); 1969 Op. N.M. A-rr'y GEN. 22 (in the absence of payment for such use, public
school buildings may not be used for religious instruction).
54. See, e.g., Pratt v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 110 Ariz. 466, 469, 520 P.2d 514, 517
(1974) (the two keys to constitutional use of school property for religious purposes are
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held. In some states, such meetings are simply not permissible
under any conditions. 56
The important point is that in many states there is at least a seri-
ous question as to whether the state constitution will permit what
the Equal Access Act requires-allowing student groups to hold
religious meetings on school premises. In such states, school au-
thorities may not be able to implement the Act's central provision
while also satisfying the state constitution. In these cases, they will
be left with two equally unpalatable choices-eliminating a "limited
open forum" by not allowing any student groups to meet, the option
Congress intended to present, or turning down federal funds, an
"fair rental value and the occasional nature of the use"); Southside Estates Baptist
Church v. Bd. of Trustees, School Tax Dist. No. 1, 115 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1959) (school
board may allow churches to use school facilities temporarily on Sundays pending com-
pletion of church construction, but permanent promotion of a particular religious de-
nomination would violate the state constitution); Resnick v. East Brunswick Township
Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978) (prolonged use of school facilities by
religious group without evidence of immediate intent to secure own building violates
state constitution); Op. MINN. ATr'y GEN. No. 170-F-4 (1943) (school boards may rent
unused space to religious groups only during summer vacation); Op. Mo. ATr'Y GEN.
No. 82 (1970) (school district may rent premises to religious organization only during
times when use for school purposes is not required); 1937-38 Op. N.M. Arr'y GEN. 36
(school board may allow parochial school students to use gymnasium only when such
use does not interfere with regular school activities); 1973 Op. N. DAK. ATr'y GEN. No. 2
(rental of state college facilities permissible only at reasonable times which do not inter-
fere with the regular activities of the college); 5 Op. TEX. ATr'y GEN. 102 (1943) (school
board may lease school property for sectarian purposes only if the lease in no way inter-
feres with the use of such property for school purposes).
55. See, e.g., 1978 Op. WASH. Arr'y GEN. No. 10 at 13 (school property being rented
to religious group must be "sufficiently remote from other property being retained for
school purposes").
56. The meetings allowed under the Equal Access Act would encompass prayer, reli-
gious instruction, and other devotional activities, and would thus violate many state con-
stitutions under any arrangement. See, e.g., Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High
School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1977) (state constitution bars volun-
tary student Bible study group from meeting on public high school campus), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 877 (1977); Hysong v. Gallitzin Borough School Dist., 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482
(1894) (school directors may not permit public school buildings to be used for sectarian
religious meetings); 1976-77 Op. LA. Arr'y GEN. 153 (use of public school classroom for
religious instruction, even after school hours, violates state constitution); 1969 Op. VT.
Arr'v GEN. 95, 98 (state constitution prohibits use of public school plant for any form of
religious worship). Moreover, such meetings may be completely banned even in states
where rental of facilities to religious organizations is generally permitted. See, e.g., Op.
IOWA Arr'v GEN. (Apr. 30, 1965) (a school district is constitutionally prohibited from
permitting the use of public classrooms for religious instruction); Op. Mo. Arr'v GEN.
No. 337 (1969) (use of state college classrooms for course in religious instruction pro-
hibited under state constitution); 1952-54 Op. NEV. Airr'v GEN. 232 (school officials may
not allow use of public school buildings by religious groups for sectarian purposes),
revised, 1954-56 Op. NEV. Arr'y GEN. 76; Matter of Appeal of Irving Kleinman, 7 N.Y.
EDUC. DEVr. REP. 118 (1967) (use of public school gymnasium by parochial school team
barred under state constitution); 5 Op. N.Y. STATE CoMPT. 137 (1949) (a town may not
permit its property to be used by religious organizations for purpose of giving religious




option which always remains available, despite the express congres-
sional desire not to affect the receipt of federal funds.57 Ironically,
this conflict is likely to diminish rather than to enhance the diversity
of school environments, quite contrary to the congressional desire
in passing the Act to enrich public education. 58
C. Preemption Arguments
The characterization of the Act as a funding statute further com-
pounds implementation problems for such states by rendering inap-
plicable any preemption arguments the state might otherwise be
able to use to avoid these limited choices. In general, the congres-
sional failure to consider a conflict with state law could be cured by
reliance on preemption doctrine, which requires clear congressional
intent to displace state law before the state provision is rendered
ineffective. 59 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that federal-
ism considerations require a presumption that state law is pre-
served,60 particularly where the congressional action is in a field that
"has been traditionally occupied by the States." 6 1 If only congres-
sional intent were examined, the absence of any congressional con-
sideration of the issue of state constitutional provisions, combined
with the general congressional concern with maintaining the discre-
tion of local school authorities62 and the traditional role of the states
57. See supra note 41.
58. If the implementation problems faced by state officials are reconsidered in light
of the enforcement problems created by the congressional failure to specify the in-
tended remedies, it is true that there exists an additional alternative to those so far con-
sidered-that of ignoring the Act altogether. However, school authorities cannot afford
simply to disregard federal law, and the uncertainty created by even a potentially unen-
forceable statute remains substantial.
59. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 ("Consideration under the
Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to dis-
place state law.") (citations omitted); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947) ("We start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress."), quoted in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). Such an
intent may, however, be either "explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 520, 525
(1977) (citations omitted); see also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) ("[A]
purpose [to displace state law] may be evidenced in several ways.") (citations omitted).
60. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (the assumption that
state law is not superseded absent clear intent to do so "provides assurance that 'the
federal-state balance' will not be disturbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily
by the courts").
61. Id.
62. Congress's desire to retain local discretion was reflected both in the inclusion of
a special proviso reaffirming the authority of the school to "maintain order and disci-
pline," Equal Access Act § 802(f), which was described as affirming that "school authori-
ties are in command . ..and they remain in command," 130 CONG. REC. S8352 (daily
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in the educational field, 63 might well lead to the conclusion that
Congress intended to preserve the role of the states. 64
However, a fundamental prerequisite to any preemption argu-
ment is missing here: In order to hold that the state should be al-
lowed to implement its constitution, the court would first have to
ascertain that the two laws are in conflict.65 Such confict does not
exist here, however; both state and federal law can be implemented,
since the state is left with other options, albeit undesirable ones, to
violating one law or the other. Ultimately fatal to a preemption ar-
gument, therefore, is the fact that the Act does not actually displace
state law. No matter how unpalatable the choices created, the fact
that options exist effectively eliminates any preemption argument
that might otherwise be relevant. 66
ed. June 27, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield), and in the congressional concern for leav-
ing decisions as to how to implement the Act in the hands of local authorities, see, e.g., id.
at S8357 (remarks of Sen. Durenberger) (the Act "retains local school board control
over its schools" since the board decides whether to create a limited open forum and can
set time and place regulations); id. at S8362 (remarks of Sen. Mattingly) (the Act leaves
decisions on "local school scheduling [and] the structure of student activities" in the
hands of local school authorities).
63. See infra notes 80-81.
64. In Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974), for example, the Supreme Court
read into another educational funding statute, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965, a congressional intent to preserve the role of state constitutions,
based on only a few sparse comments in the legislative history and the general federal
policy of noninterference. Id. at 417 n. 13. Such a holding could also be made here,
based on the inclusion of provisions for preservation of state law, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 38-39, and the discussions of local autonomy, see supra note 61. It is true
that a preemption argument would run into difficulty should the two laws be found to be
so inconsistent that state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941), quoted in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978), or if compli-
ance with both is a "physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), quoted in Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v.
Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982). However, the lack of technical conflict between
the two leads to a far more serious problem: Preemption arguments cannot be made at
all.
65. See Chicago and North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S.
311, 317 (1981) (deciding whether state law is preempted is a "two-step process of first
ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and then determining the constitutional
question whether they are in conflict") (quoting Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644
(1971)).
66. In fact, this failure of preemption arguments is true to some extent of any fund-
ing legislation, even legislation which seeks to accommodate state law, since declining
funding always remains in the background as a means of implementation. In Wheeler, for
example, even though the Court held that the statute was intended to preserve the role
of state law, it noted that should the state be unable to come up with a program that
satisfied both the requirements of Title I and the state constitution, declining funds
under the Act always remains an option. See 417 U.S. at 425. In that case, unlike the
present one, it was at least theoretically possible to implement both state and federal
law, since there were a number of different ways the state could structure the provision




III. The Problems Created By Reliance on Federal Funding
The Act's many enforcement problems do not stem from a single
cause, nor are they susceptible to a single solution. The congres-
sional failure to provide specific enforcement mechanisms, for ex-
ample, which creates serious problems in the Act as it presently
stands, is primarily attributable to poor draftsmanship, and could be
cured by simple amendment of the Act's language. The implemen-
tation dilemmas created for state officials, however, reveal a much
more fundamental problem with the Act's basic structure: These
stem from the congressional reliance on funding legislation to dic-
tate a uniform school meetings policy to the states. It is this reliance
which creates the draconian choices offered many school boards,
and which displaces standard preemption arguments. Moreover, ty-
ing the Act to federal funds further exacerbates the enforcement
problems created by poor drafting, rendering uncertain the availa-
bility of traditional enforcement mechanisms. These unanticipated
flaws in the Act suggest that Congress has legislated here under the
spending power without carefully considering the unique qualities
of funding statutes.
There is a basic difference recognized between funding statutes
and all other legislation. Such statutes are considered to have the
status of contracts between the state and federal governments, in
which the state agrees to abide by certain conditions in exchange for
receiving federal funds. 67 Most funding legislation is in fact con-
sciously administered as a contract: The legislation embodies the
federal offer, the state knowingly and voluntarily accepts the terms68
(usually by providing a written assurance of compliance),69 and the
agreement is legally enforceable against either.70 This fiction allows
the federal government far broader power than it would otherwise
enjoy; 7' it is free to attach a wide variety of conditions to the receipt
of designing a plan meeting both the federal and state restrictions. There is no similar
flexibility under the Equal Access Act, since the Act requires what the state constitution
prohibits.
67. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17.
68. See id. ("[Tihe legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending
power. . . rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
'contract'.") (citations omitted).
69. Every school district that receives federal assistance must sign assurances of
compliance with a number of federal laws, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (1982), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1982), and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1970). See generally Stern, Public Education, 10 URE. LAw. 497 (1978).
70. See Stern, supra note 69.
71. See Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 405-06 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[T]he gen-
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of federal funds 72-premised on the fact that the state is equally free
to reject the conditions by turning down the funds. 73 Thus, the cen-
tral element which justifies the expansive congressional power
under the spending clause is the idea that the state always has a
choice whether or not to accept funds. This remains true regardless
of whether Congress includes a cut-off proviso in the legislation.
In this case, however, the existence of this "choice" to turn down
federal funds operates to limit the state's options rather than ex-
pand them, since the option of implementing the Act may be fore-
closed by the state constitution.74 At the same time, interpreting the
Act under contract principles also affects judicial decisions as to
what parties are entitled to enforce that contract because contracts
are generally enforceable only by the parties themselves or by third
party beneficiaries; this makes the omission of statutory causes of
action a far more serious matter than it would be under mandatory
legislation.75
The Equal Access Act, moreover, operates only imperfectly, even
eral welfare clause is ... an independent-and expansive-source of Congress' spend-
ing authority;" "[t]he conditions that Congress may set in disbursing federal funds are
not restricted to those areas over which Congress has direct regulatory authority".).
72. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 ("[O]ur cases have long recognized that Congress
may fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the States."); Oklahoma v.
United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 144 ("The offer of benefits to a state
by the United States dependent upon cooperation by the state with federal plans, as-
sumedly for the general welfare, is not unusual.").
73. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (any state
may "choose to conform to federal requirements or to forego federal funds"); Florida
Dept. of Health v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 274, 284 (N.D. Fla. 1978) ("[Any state which
objects to the 'strings' attached to receipt of the federal funds has the option to refuse
both the grants-in-aid and the objectionable conditions."). The key distinction is that
such terms, which apply to the states through the indirect mechanism of funding, are
considered "voluntary" requirements, as opposed to the "mandatory" requirements of
legislation which applies directly. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 27 (noting the "well-
settled distinction between congressional 'encouragement' of state programs and the
imposition of binding obligations on the States"). The doctrinal implications of this
distinction are far-reaching. Challenges to congressional exercises of the spending
power succeed only when "by no reasonable possibility can the challenged legislation
fall within the wide range of discretion permitted to the Congress," United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976) (the spend-
ing clause is not "a limitation upon congressional power" but rather "a grant of power,
the scope of which is quite expansive"); Walker Field Public Airport Auth. v. Adams, 606
F.2d 290, 297 (10th Cir. 1979) ("Unless barred by some controlling constitutional pro-
hibition, the Federal Government may impose the terms and conditions upon which its
money allotments to the States shall be disbursed .. ").
74. It is true that Congress intended to present at least one choice under the Act-
the choice of whether to let all student groups, including religious ones, meet, or to
choose not to give access to any student groups. However, Congress never anticipated
that for some states, the choice would become one between banning all student groups
and forgoing federal funds.




as a funding statute. Unlike other funding legislation, the Act does
not seek to regulate the use of funds provided to the states. Nor
does it authorize any program of additional appropriations.7 6 In-
stead, it merely uses the existence of funding as a trigger for the
application of new substantive requirements. In contract terms, this
represents an attempt by the federal government to unilaterally
change the terms of existing contracts providing for federal funding
of public education. Such changes have previously been accom-
plished by requiring the state to show its assent to the new condi-
tions before receiving any additional funds under existing
programs. 77 However, the Equal Access Act does not provide any
mechanism by which states can signal their assent to the modified
terms. Written assurances of agreement to comply with the law are
not required by the legislation itself, and the statute makes no provi-
sion for administrative coordination with existing funding pro-
grams. In fact, the cut-off proviso may make it impossible for the
government to obtain such assurances: If funds cannot be denied
for failure to comply with the Act, it is hard to see how an agreement
to comply can be required as a condition of disbursing such funds.78
Thus, under the structure of the Act, it is unclear how the state can
ever signal its acceptance of the changed terms in a manner unam-
biguous enough to form a binding contract, as is necessary to make
funding laws effective.
The key question is: Why is the Act so structured? Why did Con-
gress forgo direct regulation of educational policy, adopting indi-
rect regulation through the spending power instead? The answer is
76. For example, it is striking to contrast the Equal Access Act with the Education
for Economic Security Act, to which it was appended; the specific purpose of this latter
Act is to "make financial assistance available to State and local educational agencies" to
help them improve the quality of their math and science instruction. See H.R. 1310, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 261 (1984).
77. This is done, for example, under the provision of the Education Amendments of
1972 that prohibits discrimination on account of sex in any program receiving federal
funds, a provision that uses language very similar to that used in the Act. However, that
statute contains two important differences: first, Title IX specifically provides for admin-
istrative enforcement, id. at § 1682, which the Agency has interpreted to require written
assurances of compliance from the state before receipt of funds under any federal pro-
gram, see supra notes 69-70; second, Title IX could have been enacted under § 5 of the
fourteenth amendment rather than the spending power, so Congress's power to require
these conditions is in any case clear, see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478 (1979)
(where Congress could have achieved its objectives by use of its § 5 power, the objec-
tives are also within the scope of the spending power).
78. It is true that the continued receipt by the state of federal funds after the Act's
effective date might be considered to complete the contract. However, it is not at all
clear whether this would constitute the type of knowing and voluntary acceptance of the
Act's terms required to make them binding.
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that, in our federal system, it is highly questionable whether such
legislation could be structured in any other way. While Congress
could theoretically have allowed funds to be denied under the Act,
the inclusion of a cut-off proviso reflected objections to what was
perceived as an overbearing federal intrusion into local school ad-
ministration. 79 More importantly, even if the Act had been drafted
differently, Congress could not have avoided tying the Act to federal
funds in the first place. In the area of public education, the use of
funding statutes has been characteristic, because of the tremendous
controversy that would arise from any congressional attempt to dic-
tate directly to the states how to provide educational services. Edu-
cation has long been recognized as being one of the most important
functions of state governments, 80 and it is the states which bear by
far the greatest burden of providing educational services in this
country.8 ' For Congress to directly intrude upon an area which has
for so long been viewed fundamentally as a state responsibility
would be politically difficult and unwise. By tying the same duties to
federal funds, however, Congress is seen as playing a legitimate, if
coercive, role. Thus, many of the problems which plague the Act
are inevitable if Congress is to attempt to legislate educational poli-
cies which are also regulated by state constitutions-such as those
concerning the role of religion in the public schools. This strongly
suggests that such policy issues are better fit for judicial resolution,
which does not depend on a problematic relation to federal
funding.8 2
79. See supra note 41.
80. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Education is perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments."). Public education is con-
stitutionally mandated in all but two states. See Griffith, The U.S. Department of Education
and the Issue of Control of Education, 12 URB. LAw. 500, 501 (1980).
81. Federal funds provide an average of only 8.7 percent of the total funds spent for
elementary and secondary education in the United States. See Birman & Ginsburg, supra
note 5, at 473 (1982) (citing W. GRANT & L. EIDEN, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 22
(1981)).
82. None of the limitations discussed above would apply were the Supreme Court to
adopt a ruling almost identical to the Act's central provision. Under the supremacy
clause, U.S. CONST. art. V., the holding would apply directly to every school district,
without the need to rely on federal funds. Moreover, the problem of state constitutional
provisions could be dealt with directly, just as the court did in Widmar, see supra text
accompanying note 19. Thus legislation in this area raises serious questions of institu-
tional competence as well as federalism, a problem Congress may have recognized in its
attempt to borrow Widmar's language and to base the Act on judicial precedent. See S.
REP. No. 357, supra note 7 (50-page report consisting mainly of an extensive analysis of
first amendment case law). Because of the delicate balance between free exercise and
free speech rights on one hand, and the establishment clause on the other, decisions on
religious issues often turn on the unique facts of the case. See Wheeler v. Barrera, 417




IV. Conclusion-Salvaging the Act through Judicious Interpretation
However undesirable and inappropriate this legislation, the fact
remains that it is law. What are courts then to do when faced with
enforcement of this Act? A number of options are available.
First, it is possible for courts to find that the Act is unconstitu-
tional. The statute raises serious questions under the federal estab-
lishment clause, since the Supreme Court refused to reach the issue
in Widmar.83 In addition, the Act may be susceptible to constitu-
tional challenge as extending beyond the admittedly broad limit of
the congressional spending power. The Court has repeatedly
stressed that there are outer limits to this power. 84
Second, courts could solve the problem of accommodating state
constitutional provisions by a broad interpretation of the Act's
"safety valves." The provision that the Act does not sanction meet-
ings that are "otherwise unlawful" 85 could be found to apply where
state constitutions prohibit activities mandated by the Act.8 6 Alter-
natively, the provision that the Act not operate to "abridge. . .con-
stitutional rights"8 7 could be interpreted to extend to state
constitutional provisions. 88 The legislative history does not ade-
cated in the context of parochial school aid has proved to be a delicate one [which usu-
ally] requires a careful evaluation of the facts of the particular case.") (citation omitted).
Thus, the Act may be seen as encroaching not only upon the states' right to establish
educational policy, but also upon the judiciary's proper role in interpreting the constitu-
tional religion clauses.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
84. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 475 (1980) (since the funding stat-
ute at issue could have been enacted under the commerce clause or § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court "need not explore the outermost limitations on the objectives
attainable through ...application of the spending power"); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563, 569 (1973) (the limits of the spending power have not been reached in the congres-
sional enactment of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). In general, the Court has
found it unnecessary to determine the limits of the spending power because there have
been alternative congressional powers under which the legislation could have been en-
acted. In this case, however, it is hard to see what source of congressional power other
than the spending power could have been relied upon. While the commerce clause has
been interpreted extremely broadly, it is nevertheless questionable whether public
school education affects the stream of commerce in any significant way. Similarly, while
the first amendment has been applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
it would be hard to justify legislating about free speech rights based on § 5 without
allowing § 5 to become a basis for any legislation affecting incorporated constitutional
rights. Thus, the question of the limits of the spending power may be squarely
presented here.
85. Equal Access Act § 802(d)(5).
86. Such an interpretation might also apply in cases where a state statute prohibited
this activity. This would be a desirable interpretation because a state statute would pose
the same dilemma to school officials as would a state constitutional provision.
87. Id. at § 802(d)(7).
88. This route would not cover the (still hypothetical) problem of a state statute. See
supra note 86.
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quately explain what these safety valves are intended to encom-
pass,89 but such interpretations would fall well within the bounds of
acceptable statutory construction.90 However, such a reading may
not go far enough toward remedying the serious problems which
beset the Act, leaving unresolved the problems of public and private
enforcement.
This objection suggests a third, and final, means of avoiding the
problems associated with the Act: Courts could find that the Act is
simply a declaration of national policy, and thus not specifically en-
forceable. While this may seem a radical solution, there is a sound
basis for such an interpretation both in the text of the Act and in the
case law. Since the Act itself provides no enforcement mechanisms,
and expressly denies the mechanism of a fund cut-off, a court must
in fact go out of its way to find an affirmative basis for suit. In par-
ticular, as has been shown above, it is not at all clear that any party,
either public or private, has standing to sue for enforcement of the
Act.9' By denying standing to all relevant parties, courts could
avoid the unforeseen remedial problems which beset the Act.
Even if the courts conclude that there exists a party with standing
to enforce the Act, they should not read the Act as imposing sub-
stantive obligations on state officials. A suit to enforce the condi-
tions of the grant, or to recover funds misspent in violation of those
terms, both depend upon a court first finding that the recipient of
federal funds voluntarily and knowingly accepted such conditions.
Here, written assurances, which would prove such consent, are
neither required nor possible, and the continued receipt of federal
funds after the Act's passage cannot necessarily be considered to
constitute knowing acceptance, given the ambiguity created by the
89. The "otherwise unlawful" provision was discussed briefly in the floor debates,
with the implication that it would apply to some state laws forbidding homosexual con-
duct. See 130 CONG. REc. S8343 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield).
However, the question of state laws that run counter to the Act's substantive provisions
did not arise. The "constitutional rights" provision was barely mentioned at all.
90. It is true that either of these readings leads to the conclusion that any state could
amend its constitution to prevent application of the Act. But allowing each state to for-
mulate, on a statewide and considered basis, the appropriate religious access policy
would be well in keeping with long-established federal policy, and would also reflect the
avowed congressional concern with federalism. Cf North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v.
Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532, 535 (E.D.N.C. 1978) (noting that were one state, "by some
oddity of its Constitution," allowed to invalidate a funding condition, then any state
"dissatisfied by some valid federal condition on a federal grant could thwart the con-
gressional purpose by the expedient of amending its constitution... ;" however, the
"validity of the power of the federal government . . . to impose a condition on federal
grants . . . does not exist at the mercy of the State Constitutions.





It is true that Congress meant the Act to have some effect. More-
over, it could be argued that the role for judicial enforcement
should be greater here than under most funding statutes because of
the absence of any other enforcement mechanisms, such as adminis-
trative implementation. However, that same failure to provide en-
forcement means could also be interpreted as evincing a
congressional concern not with applying the Act coercively, but with
articulating a clear national policy to provide guidance to school dis-
tricts. This interpretation finds some support in the legislative his-
tory of the Act.93 Thus, a court could hold that the Act, like the "bill
of rights" in Pennhurst, is neither a condition of funding nor a sub-
stantive requirement, but rather a hortatory declaration of national
policy.94
Reading the Act as a statement of national policy would resolve all
of the problems that beset it. Admittedly a bold step, this interpre-
tation of the Act is most consistent with the whole bundle of con-
gressional concerns motivating its passage, which included
federalism and the quality of education as well as religious free-
doms. Beyond this, however, the enforcement problems under the
Act should counsel this further conclusion: Where Congress struc-
tures legislation that would more appropriately be enacted as a di-
rect mandate in a form which simply creates unenforceable
"conditions" of funding, the spending power has been misused.
When this occurs, the effectiveness of congressional action is under-
mined whether or not a constitutional violation exists.
-Niki Kuckes
92. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
93. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 357, supra note 7, at 12 ("[T]he Committee recommends
that Congress adopt legislation to guide school administrators, students, and par-
ents .. ") (emphasis supplied).
94. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 31 (the Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act "establishes a national policy
and creates funding incentives. . . . [b]ut . . . does no more than that").
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